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 UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 
 FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT 
 ___________ 
 
 No. 10-3091 
 ___________ 
 
 MELVIN LINDSEY, 
        Appellant 
 
 v. 
 
DONNA ROMAN; ROBERT WADDELL; JENNIE MACKNIGHT; 
SALLY GENNARINI; JOHN KERESTES; JEFFREY A. BEARD; 
PENNSYLVANIA DEPARTMENT OF CORRECTIONS 
 ____________________________________ 
 
 On Appeal from the United States District Court 
 for the Middle District of Pennsylvania  
 (M.D. Pa. No. 10-cv-00953) 
 District Judge:  Honorable James M. Munley  
 ____________________________________ 
 
 Submitted for Possible Dismissal Due to a Jurisdictional Defect  
or for Possible Dismissal Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B) 
 or Summary Action Pursuant to Third Circuit LAR 27.4 and I.O.P. 10.6 
November 18, 2010 
  
 Before:  SLOVITER, JORDAN and GREENAWAY, JR., Circuit Judges 
  
(Opinion filed: December 1, 2010) 
 _________ 
 
 OPINION 
 _________ 
 
PER CURIAM 
 Melvin Lindsey, an inmate presently confined by the Pennsylvania Department of 
Corrections, appeals from orders of the District Court dismissing his complaint without 
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prejudice and denying his subsequent motion for reconsideration.  For the reasons that 
follow, we will affirm the judgment of the District Court. 
I. 
  In April 2010, Lindsey filed this civil rights complaint under 42 U.S.C. § 1983.  
By administrative order dated May 6, 2010, the District Court gave Lindsey thirty days to 
either pay the $350.00 filing fee or complete an application to proceed in forma pauperis 
(IFP).  Lindsey filed an incomplete IFP application – it did not include an authorization 
form – two weeks later.  In June 2010, the District Court dismissed Lindsey‟s civil action 
without prejudice because “[t]hirty (30) days have elapsed from the date of our Order and 
the Plaintiff has neither filed an authorization form nor requested an extension of time in 
which to do so.”   
 Lindsey then moved for reconsideration of the District Court‟s order, claiming that 
his failure to timely file a complete IFP application was due to forces “beyond his 
control.”  Lindsey attached to his motion a filled-out authorization form.  In July 2010, 
the District Court denied the motion for reconsideration, concluding that “petitioner fails 
to rely on one of three major grounds for reconsideration . . . and merely reargues matters 
addressed by the court and disposed of in the previous order.”1  The District Court 
                                                 
1
 The District Court did not consider whether Lindsey‟s motion for reconsideration 
could be construed as a motion for relief from judgment, based on excusable neglect, 
under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 60(b)(1).  Any error was harmless, however, 
because Lindsey‟s allegations – that his failure to file an authorization form was the 
result “of a lack of information and misfiling” – are belied by the record.  See Nara v. 
Frank, 488 F.3d 187, 193-94 (3d Cir. 2007) (“The test for „excusable neglect‟ is 
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instructed that Lindsey “may file a new action.”  The District Court reinforced that 
instruction in a footnote to its order, stating that its previous “dismissal was without 
prejudice to plaintiff‟s right to refile the action with the appropriate forms.”  Lindsey 
appealed.  
II. 
 We must first consider our jurisdiction.  The District Court dismissed Lindsey‟s 
civil action without prejudice.  The general rule is that a without-prejudice dismissal “is 
neither final nor appealable because the deficiency may be corrected by the plaintiff 
without affecting the cause of action.”  Borelli v. City of Reading, 532 F.2d 950, 951 (3d 
Cir. 1976) (per curiam).  Here, however, the District Court‟s July 2010 order made clear 
to Lindsey that the defect in his filing could not be cured in the civil action at issue, and 
that he would have to “file a new action” to advance his civil rights claims.  See Deutsch 
v. United States, 67 F.3d 1080, 1083 (3d Cir. 1995).  Therefore, we have jurisdiction 
under 28 U.S.C. § 1291 notwithstanding the District Court‟s without-prejudice dismissal. 
III. 
 A District Court‟s dismissal for failure to pay fees is reviewed for abuse of 
discretion.  See Jones v. Zimmerman, 752 F.2d 76, 78 (3d Cir. 1985).  That same 
standard is used in reviewing the denial of a motion for reconsideration.  See United 
                                                                                                                                                             
equitable, and requires us to weigh the „totality of the circumstances.‟”) (citation 
omitted).   
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States v. Dupree, 617 F.3d 724, 732 (3d Cir. 2010).  We may take summary action if an 
appeal presents no substantial question.  See 3d Cir. LAR 24.7; I.O.P. 10.6.  
 We conclude that the District Court did not abuse its discretion in dismissing 
Lindsey‟s civil action for failure to either pay the associated filing fee or file a completed 
IFP application.  Lindsey‟s IFP application was plainly lacking an authorization form, 
even though the District Court‟s May 6, 2010 administrative order explained to Lindsey 
that the form was a necessary component.  The administrative order also indicated that 
“[a]n application to proceed in forma pauperis and an authorization form [were] 
enclosed” in the District Court‟s mailing.  
 We also conclude that the District Court did not abuse its discretion in denying 
Lindsey‟s motion for reconsideration.  “The purpose of such a motion is to correct a clear 
error of law or to prevent a manifest injustice in the District Court‟s original ruling.”  
Dupree, 617 F.3d at 732.  The District Court committed no error of law in dismissing 
Lindsey‟s case.  Moreover, we cannot say that there was some manifest injustice latent in 
the District Court‟s decision; Lindsey can refile his complaint, accompanied by the 
documents that are required to obtain IFP status, at any time within the applicable 
limitations period.
2
   
                                                 
2
 Based on Lindsey‟s allegations, the earliest complained-of civil rights violation 
appears to have occurred “on or about August 14, 2009.”  Despite the time exhausted 
while Lindsey pursued this appeal, he should have no difficulty with timely refiling 
his complaint.  See Smith v. Holtz, 87 F.3d 108, 111 n.2 (3d Cir. 1996) (“In § 1983 
cases, federal courts apply the state personal injury statute of limitations, which in 
[Pennsylvania] is two years.”) (citations omitted). 
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 Accordingly, we will summarily affirm the judgment of the District Court.  
Appellant‟s motion for remand under Rule 27, Fed. R. App. P., is denied. 
 
